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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether this Court should affirm the jury’s finding that Mr.
Khawar was a private figure the night Sirhan Sirhan
assassinated Senator Kennedy.

2.

Whether this Court should reject Globe's attempt to invoke a
neutral reportage privilege after its republication of
defamatory statements.

3.

Whether this Court should affirm the jury's finding that
Globe published its article with actual malice.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR,

)

No. S054868

)

Court of Appeal
Case No. B084899

)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
)
V.

)

)
GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Los Angeles
County Superior
Court Case No.
WEC 139685

)
)

Defendant and

Appellant.

)
____ )

__________

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On August 31, 1989, respondent Khalid Khawar filed suit in
the Superior Court of California against petitioner Globe
International,

Inc.,

("Globe") seeking damages for libel.

(A.C.T, 137.)

Globe's answer argued that its publication was

constitutionally protected under a neutral reportage privilege.
(A.C.T, 184.)

After Mr. Khawar presented his evidence, Globe

entered a motion for non-suit.

(C.T. 2694.)

The court denied

Globe's motion.

(C.T. 2694.)

The jury returned a special

verdict finding:

(1) Mr. Khawar was a private figure,

article was a neutral and accurate report,

(2) Globe's

(3) Globe published

its article negligently, and (4) Globe published its article with
actual malice.

(A.C.T. 2782-83.)

Pursuant to California Code of

Civil Procedure section 592 the jury's finding on issues one and
two were only advisory.

CAL. CIV. PROC. § 592 (West 1996).

The

judge disagreed with the jury's finding that Globe's article was
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a neutral and accurate report, but agreed with the jury's finding
that Mr. Khawar was a private figure.

(C.T. 3109.)

The jury

awarded Mr. Khawar $1,175,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages against Globe.

(A.C.T. 2783, C.T. 3110.)

Globe filed timely notice of appeal.

(C.T, 3130.)

The

Court of Appeal affirmed all four of the lower courts rulings,
holding inter alia, that:

(1) Mr, Khawar was a private figure,

(2) California does not recognize a neutral reportage privilege,
and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's
finding that Globe published its article with malice.

(C.A. 1.)

Globe appealed to this Court which granted review on September
25, 1996 by order No. S054868.

See Khawar v. Globe Int'l,

Inc.,

57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1996).
Statement of Facts
On April 4, 1989 Globe published an article in its tabloid
entitled "Former CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY
FOR THE MAFIA."

(C.T. 3145.)

The article was referenced on

Globe’s front page as "Iranian Secret Police Killed Bobby
Kennedy."

(C.T. 3144.)

reporter John Blackburn.

The article was written by free-lance
(R.T. 1077.)

Globe’s article reported

on a book written by Robert Morrow entitled The Senator Must Die:
The Murder of Robert F, Kennedy.
a minor conspiracy theorist.

(R.T. 1091.)

(R.T. 2152.)

Robert Morrow is

In his book, Robert

Morrow claims that Robert Kennedy was assassinated by the Iranian
secret police working in conjunction with the Mafia.
1091.)

(C.T.

Morrow alleges that the true assassin was not Sirhan
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Sirhan but a man who called himself Ali Ahmand.
Mr. Ali Ahmad is Khalid Khawar's father.

(A.C.T. 150.)

{R.T. 1329.)

Four photographs appear in Robert Morrow's book below the
caption: "Photographs of Ali Ahmand."

(A.C.T. 172-73.)

These

photographs depict Mr. Khawar standing on a stage near Senator
Kennedy on the night of the Senator's assassination.

(A.C.T.

172-73.)

One of these pictures was reprinted in the Globe

article.

(C.T. 3145.)

Globe centered, retouched, lightened and

increased the size of the picture to make Mr. Khawar
identifiable.

(C.T. 3145, R.T. 2744.)

pointing directly to Mr. Khawar.

Globe also added an arrow

(C.T. 3145, R.T. 2744.)

Globe

attempted to contact Ali Ahmand by calling the Los Angeles
telephone directory, but was unsuccessful.
records do not reflect such an attempt.
not contact Mr, Khawar for his response.

(R.T, 1121.)

(R.T. 1121.)
(R.T. 1121.)

Globe’s

Globe did
Globe did

not contact the Los Angeles Police Department trial record
custodian, nor did it contact the Robert Kennedy Assassination
Archives.

(R.T. 1121.)

In 1962, Mr. Khawar left his native country of Pakistan to
pursue an education in the United States.

(R.T. 1331.)

A small

Pakistani periodical hired Mr. Khawar as a free-lance reported to
recount various aspects of American culture.

(R.T. 1333.)

Mr.

Khawar was issued press credentials and directed to send stories
and pictures of prominent American figures to his homeland for
publication.

(R.T. 1333, 1336.)

On June 4, 1968, Mr, Khawar reported on Senator Robert
Kennedy's campaign for presidency from the Ambassador Hotel in
Los Angeles.

(R.T. 1338.)

Mr. Khawar stepped onto the stage
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with Senator Kennedy to obtain close-up pictures.

(R.T. 1339.}

A faithful admirer of the Kennedy family, Mr. Khawar also asked a
friend to take a picture of him near the senator.
40.)

(R.T. 1339-

Mr. Khawar watched Senator Kennedy's speech and then

watched him leave to an adjacent pantry.

(R.T. 1341.)

Sirhan

Sirhan shot Senator Kennedy in the pantry with a handgun.
800, 1341.)

(R.T.

Mr. Khawar tried to enter the pantry area but was

denied access.

(R.T. 1341.)

Mr. Khawar cooperated fully with

both police and FBI investigations of the assassination.
1342, 1351.)

(R.T.

Mr. Khawar was one of at least 72 individuals

interviewed after the assassination.

(R.T. 686.)

Soon thereafter, Mr, Khawar returned to Pakistan but was
over-educated and could not find employment.

(R.T, 1352.)

Khawar returned to the United States in May, 1971.

Mr.

(R.T. 1352.)

After working as an electrical consultant for several years, Mr.
Khawar became a rural potato farmer.

(R.T. 1354-55.)

In April 1989, a former employee notified Mr. Khawar of
Globe's article identifying him as an Iranian secret agent
responsible for killing Senator Kennedy.
Khawar home and car were vandalized.

(R.T. 1359.)

(R.T. 1367.)

The

Mr. Khawar

became scared for his life as well as for the lives of his wife
and children.

(R.T. 1360-61.)

Mr. Khawar received phone calls

linking him to the Globe article from as far away as Bangkok,
Thailand.

(R.T. 1366.)

Mr. Khawar also became humiliated and

ashamed when he received several other life-threatening phone
calls.

(R.T. 1366.)

During the first phone call, Mr. Khawar

learned that he was "going to [be] taken care of" for having
allegedly killed Robert Kennedy.

(R.T. 1416.)
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In another phone

call, a man with an Arabic accent threatened to kill Mr. Khawar
"because [he] killed Kennedy and the Arabs are being blamed for
it."

(R.T. 1416.)

In the most ominous call, a man feigning an

Indian accent warned, "[y]ou people keep buying all [the] AM-PM
markets and ... I am going to come to your farm to kill you."
(R.T, 1417.)
farm.

This caller knew the exact location of Mr. Khawar's

(R.T. 1417.)

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, Mr. Khawar is a private figure,

Mr. Khawar should

not be deemed an involuntary public figure because this status is
inconsistent with a United States Supreme Court trend abandoning
the status.

Moreover, the Supreme Court’s rationale for the

public figure category conflicts with an involuntary public
figure class.

Mr. Khawar should not be deemed a limited-purpose

public figure either.

Considering the nature and extent of Mr.

Khawar's activities, Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust
himself into the forefront of a public controversy, nor did he
have the requisite regular and continuing access to the media.
Even if Mr. Khawar attained public figure status, the night
Senator Kennedy was killed in 1969, he lost the status by the
time of Globe's defamatory publication twenty-one years later.
Second, a neutral reportage privilege does not shield Globe
from liability after republishing defamatory accusations against
Mr. Khawar.

The United States Supreme Court does not currently

recognize a neutral reportage privilege.

Likewise, California

courts have not adopted a privilege for neutral reportage.

A

neutral reportage privilege is also in conflict with Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and is an unduly burdensome obstacle to
recovery.

Moreover, the facts of this case render a neutral

reportage privilege inapplicable.

The defamatory statements

reported by Globe did not originate from a credible source.
Globe's article was not directed against a public figure, and an
extension of a neutral reportage privilege to private figures in
inconsistent with binding California authority.

Finally, Globe's

article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage requirement
6

that the article be published in an accurate and disinterested
manner
Third, Mr. Khawar is entitled to punitive damages because
there is clear and convincing evidence that Globe’s article was
published with actual malice.

Actual malice exists when a

publisher has serious doubts as to the truth of its publication
but publishes anyway.

This Court should give deference to the

jury’s finding of actual malice for three reasons.

First, Globe

irresponsibly relied on unreliable sources for its article.
Second, Globe made almost no attempt to acquire knowledge of
facts which would have confirmed the falsity of its article.
Finally, Globe published an article that was glaringly false and
absurd.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEAL PROPERLY RULED THAT MR. KHAWAR WAS A
PRIVATE FIGURE.
This Court should affirm the lower court's holding that Mr.

Khawar was a private figure.

Those who attain the status of

public figure "have assumed roles of especial prominence in the
affairs of society" such that their actions "invite attention
and comment."

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354

(1974).

Three classes of individuals qualify for public figure

status.

See id. at 345-51.

First, individuals who occupy

positions of pervasive power and influence are termed "all
purpose public figures."

Id. at 351.

Second, individuals who

"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies ... to influence the resolution of the issues"
are termed "limited-purpose public figures."

Id. at 345.

Third, individuals who are "drawn into" public controversies are
termed "involuntary limited-purpose public figures."

Id. at

351.
Whether someone is a public figure is a question of law to
be reviewed de novo.

See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc.,

578 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 443
U.S. 157 (1979).
A.

Mr. Khawar was not an Involuntary Limited-Purpose
Public Figure because this Status is Inconsistent
with a United States Supreme Court Trend, the
Court's Rationale for Establishment of the Public
Figure Category, and the Facts of this Case.

Involuntary public figure status is obtained by individuals
who "through no purposeful action of
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[their] own" are drawn into

a public controversy.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

Such instances

are "exceedingly rare" because of the plaintiff's lack of
voluntary conduct and lack of media access.

Id. at 344-45.

Here, this Court should follow the United States Supreme
Court trend indicating the involuntary public figure status has
been abandoned.

This Court should reject the involuntary public

figure status because it also conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
rationale in establishing the public figure class.

Even if the

involuntary public figure status exists, the facts of this case
render the doctrine inapplicable.
1

Tbic: r.nurt Should Comport with the United States
q>ipK^TnP Court Trend Abandoning the Involuntary
Public Figure Status.

A United States Supreme Court trend indicates an
abandonment of the involuntary public figure status.

Dale

K. Nichols, The Involuntary Public Figure Class of Gertz v.
Robert Welch:
84

(1980).

na.d or Merely Dorman^, 14 U.Mich.J.L.Reform 71,

Three facts support this trend.

See

First, a

test for an involuntary public figure class does not exist.
id^

^

Second, "the Court has consistently and conspicuously

deleted involuntary public figure references from its opinions.
Third, the court has "avoided discussing involuntary publi1C
figure issues properly before it.
The united States Supreme Court has failed to construct a
test setting forth the elements of an involuntary public figure
status.

S^ i^

Even in Ger^, where the Court delineated the

different forms of public figures, an involuntary public figure
class was "tenuously suggested" with no mention of its requisite
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elements.

Nichols, supra, at 84.

Without a clear test for an

involuntary public figure, this Court has no meaningful standard
by which to gauge Mr. Khawar's conduct.
Likewise, by removing references of an involuntary public
figure status from its decisions and by avoiding discussion of
the status in relevant situations, the Court has abandoned the
category.

Wolston, 443 U.S. 157; Hutchinson v. Proxmire,

443 U.S. Ill (1979).

In Wolston, the defendant wrote and

published a book falsely naming the plaintiff a Soviet spy.
U.S. at 168.

443

The defendant argued that the plaintiff was an

involuntary public figure due to his involvement in a grand jury
investigation and his identification as a Soviet agent in a FBI
report.

See id. at 165-66.

The Court never mentioned the

involuntary public figure class.

See id. at 164.

Instead, the

Court only referred to the "all-purpose" and "voluntary limited
purpose" categories.

See id. at 164, 168.

Discussion of an involuntary public figure class was also
absent from the Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson, 443 U.S.
111.

The Hutchinson Court refused to impose public figure

status on a professor whose work was publicized as an example of
wasteful government spending.

Id. at 134-36.

In its opinion,

the Court made no reference to the involuntary public figure
class.

Like Wolston, the Court construed Gertz as establishing

only two categories of public figures: the general and limitedpurpose public figures.

See id. at 134,

The Court failed to

apply, or even discuss, the involuntary public figure issue
despite the plaintiff's "likely Candida[cy] for that status."
Nichols, supra, at 82.

The Court's decision not to discuss the

10

category weighs heavily against the involuntary status'
continued viability.
2.

California Should Reject an Involuntary Public
Figure Status Because it Fails to Comport with the
Supreme Court's Rationale for Establishment of the
Public Figure Category.

An involuntary public figure status does not comport with
the Gertz rationale.

In Gertz, the Supreme Court recognized two

justifications for public figure status,

(1) public figures have

"voluntarily exposed themselves to an increased risk of injury
from defamatory falsehood[s]

..." and (2) public figures have

more significant access to channels of communication that enable
them to rebut defamatory accusations.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

The Gertz Court found "voluntariness" to be a vital
requisite for public figure status.

Id. at 345.

The Court's

use of the words "expose," "involvement," "thrust," and engage"
all point to the importance of voluntariness in making public
figure determinations.

Id.

An involuntary public figure, by

definition, fails to comport with the voluntariness requirement.
An involuntary public figure does not "expose," "involve[],"
"thrust," nor "engage" himself in a public controversy.

Id.

Thus, an involuntary public figure status does not comport with
the Gertz Court rationale and should be rejected.
Moreover, finding Mr. Khawar an involuntary public figure
could have dramatic consequences.

Private individuals whose

pictures are taken near a public controversy could be implicated
by the media with immunity from defamation actions.

For

instance, any private individual captured on film the night of

11

the 1996 Olympic bombing could be implicated by the media as an
involuntary public figure.

Anyone present at the event,

and

captured on film, could be branded by the media as a terrorist.
Surely, the Supreme Court did not intend to give the media such
unchecked discretion.

3.

Even if this Court Finds that an Involuntary
Public Figure Status Exists, the Facts of this
Case Render the Doctrine Inapplicable.

Mr. Khawar is not an involuntary limited-purpose public
figure.

Unlike the plaintiff in Wolston, Mr. Khawar was not the

subject of an official criminal investigation.

(R.T. 931-32.)

Mr, Khawar was a mere bystander the night of Senator Kennedy's
assassination.

(R.T. 1341.)

Although Mr. Khawar did step onto

a stage to have his picture taken next to the Senator, he never
entered the pantry area where the Senator was eventually killed.
(R.T. 1339, 1341.)

Even if Mr. Khawar took a more active role

the night of Senator Kennedy's assassination, his mere
involvement in the important issue is insufficient to attain
involuntary public figure status.

See Wolston, 433 U.S. at 165.

Furthermore, in Hutchinson the plaintiff was not an
involuntary public figure although he was drawn out of his
laboratory and into the spotlight by the defendant's statements.
443 U.S. at 111.

Mr. Khawar was also drawn into the spotlight

by Globe's defamatory accusation that he was a member of the
Iranian secret police that killed Senator Robert Kennedy.
3145.)

(C.T.

Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hutchinson, Mr.

Khawar should not be found an involuntary public figure.

12

B.

The Nature and Extent of Mr. Khawar's Participation is
Insufficient to Justify Limited-Purpose Public Figure
Status»

Whether a private individual attains limited-purpose public
figure status depends on "the nature and extent of an
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving
rise to the defamation."

Gertz, 418 U.S, at 352.

There is an

initial presumption that the defamed plaintiff is a private
individual.

See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d

1541, 1552 {4th Cir. 1994).

To rebut this presumption, the

defendant must show two elements:

(1) that the plaintiff

voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy in order
to influence its outcome, and (2) the plaintiff must have
regular and continuing access to the media.
at 344-45.

See Gertz, 418 U.S.

These factors are resolved by considering the

evidence in light of the totality of the circiimstances.

See

Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal, 3d 244, 255
(1984).
When considering the nature and extent of Mr. Khawar's
activities, this Court should find that Globe failed to prove
that Mr. Khawar attained a limited-purpose public figure status.
Viewed in the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Khawar did not
voluntarily thrust himself into the public controversy, did not
seek to influence its resolution, and failed to enjoy the
requisite access to effective channels of media communication.
///
///
///
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1.

Mr. Khawar did not Voluntarily Thrust Himself into
a Role of Special Prominence/ nor did he Seek to
Influence the Resolution or Outcome of a Public
Controversy,

To be classified as a limited-purpose public figure, a
private individual must voluntarily "thrust [himself] to the
forefront of [a] particular public controversy" in an effort to
influence the resolution of the issues.

Gertz, 418 U.S, at 345,

In furtherance of this goal, the individual must assume a role
of special prominence.

See id. at 351.

Special prominence

requires that the individual be at the forefront of the public
controversy so as to invite public attention and comment.
id. at 345.

See

Merely "becoming involved in or associated with a

matter that attracts public attention" is insufficient to obtain
limited-purpose public figure status.

Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.

An individual does not thrust himself into a public
controversy by mere affiliation with an event that attracts
publicity.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.

In Gertz, an

attorney voluntarily represented a family in a civil suit
against a policeman charged with the murder of their son.
at 325,

Id.

A subsequent magazine article alleged that the civil

suit was part of the attorney's Communist plan to discredit the
police.

See id. at 325-26.

The article accused the attorney of

framing the police and named the attorney a "Leninist" and a
"Communist-fronter."

Id.

Although the attorney voluntarily associated himself with a
case which he knew would attract extensive publicity, the Gertz
Court concluded that the attorney was a private figure.
The Court determined that the "nature and extent" of the
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I^

I

lawyer's participation was limited to his representation of his
client.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-26,

The Court held that the

attorney "did not voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex" of
the public controversy, nor did he attempt to generate public
interest to influence its outcome.

Id, at 351-52.

Similarly, individuals who are dragged into a public
controversy do not achieve limited-purpose public figure status.
See, e.g,, Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166.

In Wolston, a Russian-born

naturalized citizen failed to respond to a grand jury subpoena
in a Soviet espionage investigation.

Id. at 162.

Sixteen years

later, the defendant publisher referred to the plaintiff as a
Soviet agent.

See id. at 159.

The Court refused to label the

plaintiff a limited-purpose public figure.

See id. at 166.

The

Court determined that the plaintiff's decision "not to appear
before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended
by publicity," was not decisive of public-figure status.
166.

Id. at

The Wolston Court held that the plaintiff was "dragged

unwillingly into the controversy," and that his actions did not
"justify the conclusion , . , that [the plaintiff]

'voluntarily

thrust' or 'injected' himself into the forefront of the public
controversy . . ,

Id.

Likewise, Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust himself to
the forefront of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

Mr. Khawar

was not a public figure due to his mere proximity to the events
which resulted in the assassination of Senator Kennedy.

Mr.

Khawar's involvement in Senator Kennedy's assassination was
limited to his attendance at the Kennedy presidential campaign
rally and appearance on the stage near the presidential
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candidate.

{R.T. 1339.)

Although Mr. Khawar decided to stand

on the stage behind the Senator, this action is insufficient to
satisfy the "voluntary thrust" element required by Gertz.
1339.)

(R.T.

Mr. Khawar made no voluntary attempt to influence the

resolution of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

Rather, Mr.

Khawar was unwillingly dragged into the controversy by Globe's
defamatory article.

These actions are insufficient to

constitute limited-purpose public figure status.
2.

Mr. Khawar did not Enjoy the Requisite Access to
Effective Channels of Media Communication.

Mr. Khawar did not enjoy the requisite access to effective
channels of media communication.

In contrast to a private

figure, a public figure must have significantly greater access
to the media and thus a better opportunity to refute defamatory
statements.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

"regular and continuing."

This access must be

Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.

Mere

access to the media is insufficient to obtain a limited-purpose
public figure status.

See Time, Inc, v. Firestone, 424 U.S.

448, 455 (1975).
In Firestone, the plaintiff was involuntarily hauled into
court when her wealthy husband initiated a divorce proceeding.
Id. at 453.

During the proceeding, which attracted heavy media

attention, the plaintiff held several press conferences.
id. at 455, 486.

See

The Court reasoned that there was "no

indication that she sought to use the press conferences as a
vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of some
[public controversy] in order to influence its resolution."
id.
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See

Mr. Khawar's minimal media access does not make him a
public figure.

In fact, Mr. Khawar's access to the media was

less than the plaintiff in Firestone, who was found to be a
private figure.

Unlike the plaintiff in Firestone, Mr. Khawar

was not wealthy and was thus unable to call press conferences to
rebut Globe's accusations.

As a small-town potato farmer, Mr.

Khawar had no interest in attracting the publicity he received
through Globe's article.

(R.T. 1355, 1362.)

resulted was uninvited and unwelcome.

The publicity that

(R.T. 1362-65.)

Mr.

Khawar's lack of access to the media thus confirms his status as
a private figure.
Regular and continued access to the media is a requisite to
becoming a public figure.

See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136.

A

single response to a defamatory accusation does not constitute
"regular and continuing access."

Id.

For example, in

Hutchinson a professor responded to derogatory remarks made by a
senator who singled-out the professor's studies as an example of
governmental waste.

Id. at 136.

The scope of the professor's

access to the media consisted of newspaper and wire service
reports through which he responded to the defamation.
at 134.

See id.

Because the access came only after the alleged libel,

and ceased once the controversy was over, the Court found that
the professor did not have "the regular and continuing access to
the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a
public figure."

Id.

Likewise, Mr. Khawar did not have regular and continued
access to the media.

Mr. Khawar made only a single response to

Globe's defamatory charges.

(R.T. 1369.)
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Mr. Khawar's response

also came after the alleged libel occurred.

(R.T. 1368.)

Unlike the plaintiff in Firestone, Mr. Khawar did not seek the
press nor did he call press conferences.

Instead, by

reluctantly acquiescing to a single local television interview,
Mr. Khawar limited his media access.

(R.T. 1368.)

Moreover,

while Mr. Khawar's access was limited to a local television
station. Globe's article had national and international
ramifications.

(R.T. 1366-67.)

Mr. Khawar did not have either

national or international media access through which to
adequately rebut the damage to his reputation.

Mr, Khawar did

not voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of the Kennedy
assassination, nor seek to influence its resolution through his
singular, limited media contact.

Rather, Mr. Khawar sought only

to mollify the deleterious affects of statements by Globe on his
reputation.
C.

Even if Mr. Khawar Attained Either Involuntary or
Voluntary Limited Public Figure Status at the Time of
Senator Kennedy's Assassination, he no Longer had thi^
Status Twenty-One Years Later.

Passage of time is also an important factor in determining
public figure status.
concurring).
Wolston.

Id.

See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 170,

(Black, J.,

The Supreme Court found lapse of time relevant in
Passage of time is important for two reasons:

(1)

the passage of several years "between a controversial event and
a libelous utterance . . . diminish[es] the defamed party's
access to the means of counterargument[,]" and (2) the lapse of
time diminishes whatever "public scrutiny" the purported public
figure may have assumed.

Id. at 170-71,
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Lapse of time should

be considered persuasive in the determination of public figure
status.

See Naantaanbuu v. Abernathy, 816 F.Supp. 218, 223

(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In Naantaanbuu, the plaintiff was alleged to have had a
sexual encounter with Martin Luther King, Jr., the night before
his assassination.

Id. at 221.

The plaintiff was held to be a

private figure because she had gone "some twenty-five years
without being pulled into the controversy . . .

M. at 223.

Similar to Naantaanbuu, Mr. Khawar went twenty-one years
without being pulled into a public controversy.

This lapse of

time weighs in favor of finding Mr. Khawar a private figure at
the time Globe published its article.

Assuming, arguendo, that

Mr. Khawar gained either involuntary or voluntary limitedpurpose public figure status when he was present at Senator
Kennedy's assassination in 1968, he lost that distinction by the
time Globe published its libelous article in 1989.

The lapse of

the intervening twenty-one years militates against finding Mr.
Khawar a public figure when the article was published.

Even if

there was a public controversy as to what happened the night of
the assassination in 1968, the passage of the intervening
twenty-one years, without a single mention of Mr. Khawar,
removed the possibility of any continued public figure status.
This Court should affirm the lower court's holding that Mr.
Khawar was a private figure.

Mr. Khawar should not be deemed

either an involuntary or voluntary limited-purpose figure.

An

involuntary public figure status is inappropriate considering
the strong United States Supreme Court trend abandoning the
status.

The status also conflicts with the Court's rationale
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for a public figure category.

Even if an involuntary public

figure class exists, Mr. Khawar's activities were insufficient
to render the doctrine applicable.

Likewise, the voluntary

limited-purpose class is rendered inapplicable to Mr. Khawar.
Mr. Khawar did not voluntarily thrust himself into a public
controversy and did not have channels through which to
effectively rebut Globe's defamatory statements.

The passage of

twenty-one years from the time of Senator Kennedy's
assassination also distinguishes Mr. Khawar as a private figure.
Consequently, this Court should affirm Mr. Khawar*s private
figure status.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEAL PROPERLY RULED THAT A NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT GLOBE'S REPUBLICATION OF
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS.
Globe's article is not constitutionally protected by a

"neutral reportage privilege."

As a republisher of defamatory

statements, Globe is liable as if it was the original publisher.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581, pp. 231

(1979).

A

minority of jurisdictions recognize a controversial exception to
this general rule in a neutral reportage privilege.

A neutral

reportage privilege protects media defendants from defamation
liability when they neutrally and accurately report newsworthy
charges made by credible sources against public figures.

See

Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1977).
The Second Circuit first recognized a neutral reportage
privilege in Edwards.

Id. at 120.

The Edwards court found the

New York Times not liable for defamation after its accurate
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republication of defamatory statements originally made by the
National Audubon Society.

Id. at 115.

The newspaper quoted

Audubon officials who identified five prominent scientists as
"being paid to lie."

at 117.

The article also included

denials from three of the five defamed scientists.

See id.

The

court held "[w]hen a responsible/ prominent organization like
the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a
public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and
disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the
reporter's private views regarding their validity.

j.-r

120.

Courts construe four requirements for a neutral reportage
privilege:

(1) the defamatory statement must be a newsworthy

charge that creates or is associated with a public controversy,
(2) the original defamatory statement must be made by a
responsible and prominent source,

(3) the defamatory statement

must concern a public official or a public figure, and (4) the
defamatory statement must be reported neutrally and accurately
by the publisher.
Requirement

Justin Wertman, The Newsworthiness

the Privilege of Neutral Reportage is a Matter of

Public Concern, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 793 (1996).
Here, the Court of Appeal's rejection of a neutral
reportage privilege should be affirmed.
recognize a neutral reportage privilege.

California does not
Legal precedent and

public policy militate against recognizing neutral reportage
privilege.

Moreover, the facts of this case render such a

privilege inapplicable.
///
///
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A.

California does not Recognize a Neutral Reportage
Privilege.

Neither the Supreme Court of the United States, nor this
Court recognize a neutral reportage privilege.

Nevertheless,

two California cases are misapplied in support of the
proposition that California has adopted a neutral reportage
privilege.^

See Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App, 3d 129

(1980); Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868 (1983).
In Weingarten, the court never endorsed a neutral reportage
privilege.

102 Cal. App. 3d at 137.

The plaintiff in

Weingarten assumed a role of prominence after he was discharged
as city attorney and retaliated by initiating a recall movement
against city council members who voted for his dismissal.

Id.

The defendant newspaper published two articles concerning the
plaintiff's involvement in the recall movement and his alleged
misuse of his position to amass a considerable fortune.

See id.

The Weingarten court quoted a brief passage from Edwards in
support of a general proposition that a newspaper may print
defamatory statements against a public figure without automatic
liability.

I^ at 148.

The Weingarten court was not concerned

with a neutral reportage privilege, but with whether the
plaintiff was a public figure and whether the evidence was
sufficient to support a finding of malice.

Id. at 133.

The

^ Stockton Newspapers, Inc, v. Superior Court, is also cited as
recognizing a neutral reportage privilege.
206 Cal. App. 3d 966
(1988), overruled by Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711
(1989). The Stockton court's vague reference to Edwards appeared in a
footnote, and is only used to note the similarities between a neutral
reportage privilege and California Civil Code's "public interest
privilege." I^ at 981 n.6. Even then, however, the court recognized
a neutral reportage privilege as contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gertz.
See Id.
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Weingarten court never identified a neutral reportage privilege,
nor did the court set forth the elements thereof.

In sum, the

Weingarten court gave no indication that its brief quote should
be construed as an endorsement of the Edwards holding.
The court, in Grillo, also failed to endorse a neutral
reportage privilege.

144 Cal. App. 3d at 871.

The plaintiff, a

municipal court judge, personally arrested a county auditor,
held him in contempt and sentenced him to jail.
Los Angeles Times reported the event.

See id.

The

Like Weingarten,

the Grillo court cited to dicta from Edwards.

Id. at 872.

The

Grillo court used the Edwards reference to reject the
plaintiff's argument that a newspaper is automatically liable
for its reports.

I_^

The court ultimately found against the

plaintiff because statements of opinion concerning the conduct
of public officials are privileged under both California and
United States Constitutions.

See id.

The court did not base

its reasoning on the existence of a neutral reportage privilege.
The Grillo court never mentioned a neutral reportage privilege
by name, nor laid out the elements of the privilege thereof.
The Grillo court gave no indication that its brief quote from
Edwards represented an endorsement of a neutral reportage
privilege.
Neither Weingarten nor Grillo adopt a neutral reportage
privilege.

The courts' brief references to Edwards were merely

tangential to their ultimate holdings.

The references were not

intended as wholesale endorsements of the Edwards doctrine.

To

date, California courts have not recognized a neutral reportage
privilege.
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B.

Legal Precedent and Public Policy Militate Against
Recognizing a Neutral Reportage Privilege.

A neutral reportage privilege is inconsistent with
defamation jurisprudence and is unduly burdensome to recovery.
Accordingly, several courts and legal scholars criticize and
reject a neutral reportage privilege.

See Dickey v. CBS Inc.,

583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Dennis J. Dobbels,
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc,: A Constitutional
Privilege to Republish Defamation Should Be Rejected, 33
Hastings L.J. 1203 (1982),

Rejecting jurisdictions find a

neutral reportage privilege (1) in conflict with Supreme Court
defamation jurisprudence, and (2) an unduly burdensome obstacle
to recovery.
1.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict with
Supreme Court Defamation Jurisprudence.

Courts that explicitly reject a neutral reportage privilege
find it in conflict with United States Supreme Court defamation
jurisprudence.

See, e.g., Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225-26.

In

Dickey, the media defendant repeated defamatory charges against
a congressional candidate.

Id. at 1223-24.

The defendant

asserted that a neutral reportage privilege protected its
republication.

See id.

The Third Circuit quickly rejected the

defendant's invitation to adopt the privilege.

See id. at 1225.

The Dickey court found a neutral reportage privilege in conflict
with United States Supreme Court decisions in both St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), and Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225-26.
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a.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict
with St. Amant v. Thompson.

This Court should find a neutral reportage privilege in
conflict with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in St.
Amant.

The First Amendment prohibits a public figure or

official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
unless they prove that the statement was made with "actual
malice."
65 (1964).

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264In St. Amant, the Court held that actual malice

exists when the defendant "entertains serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication," and publishes despite these doubts.
390 U.S. at 731.

A neutral reportage privilege protects the

republication of defamatory accusations even when the reporter
entertains serious doubts as to the publication's validity.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

See

Thus, a neutral reportage privilege

would protect a media defendant from liability, even if the
defendant satisfied the Supreme Court's actual malice standard.
A neutral reportage privilege should therefore be rejected as
inconsistent with Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence.
b.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege is in Conflict
with Gertz v. Robert Welch^ Jnc..

A neutral reportage privilege is also inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's holding in Gertz.

A neutral reportage privilege

requires that the defamatory statement be a newsworthy charge
that creates or is associated with a public controversy.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

In Gertz, however, the Supreme Court

repudiated a "newsworthiness test" as a basis for determining
whether the First Amendment protects a defamatory publication.
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Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345''48.

The Court recognized that a

newsworthiness analysis fails to accommodate the state's
interest in protecting individual reputation.

See id. at 346.

Instead, the Court concluded that the public or private status
of the accused is the proper standard in defamation actions.
See id.
The Court again rejected a newsworthiness test in
Firestone.

424 U.S. at 455-56.

There, the plaintiff sued after

the defendant inaccurately reported on her divorce proceeding.
See id. at 452.

The defendant argued that the publication was

newsworthy and thus privileged.

See id.

The Court rejected

this argument in favor of a test focusing on the plaintiff's
public or private status.

See id. at 455-56.

The Supreme Court repudiated newsworthiness as a basis for
applying First Amendment protection.

Accordingly, a neutral

reportage privilege should not afford media defendants absolute
immunity to report newsworthy defamatory statements.

Legal

scholars note that "the Edwards decision epitomizes a common
misconception in constitutional law, that certain [newsworthy]
defamatory statements are inherently worthy of First Amendment
protection."

Dobbels, supra, at 1224.

When rejecting the

newsworthiness test in Gertz and Firestone, the Court balanced
countervailing interests in free speech and privacy by focusing
on the status of the defeaned not the newsworthiness of the

///

///
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article.

Because newsworthiness is a basis for a neutral

reportage privilege, and the Court has repudiated such a test,
the privilege is at odds with defamation jurisprudence and
should therefore be rejected.
2,

2

A Neutral Reportage Privilege is an Unduly
Burdensome Obstacle to Recovery.

Considering that "[d]efamation defendants now have a
panoply of constitutional protections," a neutral reportage
privilege is an unduly burdensome obstacle to recovery.

Brown,

48 Cal. 3d at 747; accord Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325
N.W. 2d 511, 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)

(declining to recognize a

neutral reportage privilege because the press is adequately
protected).

The actual malice standard is a basis for many

barriers in defamation recovery.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 747,

Actual malice makes recovery for defamation extremely
difficult.
damages.

Public figures must prove "actual malice" to recover
See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.

Private figures

must also prove actual malice when seeking punitive damages.
See id. at 347.

Actual malice requires proof that the defendant

had knowledge of the article's falsity or acted with reckless
disregard for the truth.

See

at 254,

This must be shown by

the stringent clear and convincing evidence standard.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.

See

Furthermore, recovery is more difficult

^ Several other jurisdictions recognized Edwards as inconsistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Newell v. Fields Enters. Inc.,
415 N.E.2d 434, 452 (Ill. App. 3d 1980) ("Constitutional protection of
the press from libel actions turns on the status of the plaintiff,
regardless of the subject matter of the publication. ); see also Hogan
V. Herald Co., 444 N.E.2d 1002, 1014 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("It is not
possible to reconcile [the privilege of neutral reportage] with [the
Supreme Court's] prior decision in Gertz. ).
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because "an appellate court must independently review all the
evidence on the issue of actual malice."
747.

Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at

These hurdles make defamation recovery burdensome enough

without the additional obstacle of a neutral reportage
privilege.
Even without a neutral reportage privilege, the media is
sufficiently protected against defamation actions.
750.

See id. at

As this Court recognized, "only about ten percent of all

libel suits are pursued seriously."

Id.

Moreover, only about

one percent of all libel cases are fully tried/ and as to that
one percent, nearly seventy percent are overturned on appeal.
See id.

This is overwhelming evidence that a defamation victim

faces "almost insurmountable obstacles to recovery .
at 751.

.

.

Id.

An additional obstacle to recovery is therefore

unnecessary and unduly burdensome.
C.

This Court Need not Adopt or Reject a Neutral Reportage
Privilege because the Facts of this Case Render the
Doctrine Inapplicable.

Even if this Court acknowledges a neutral reportage
privilege, the facts of this case render such a doctrine
inapplicable.

Courts articulate four elements to a neutral

reportage privilege:

(1) the defamatory statement must be a

newsworthy charge that creates or is associated with a public
controversy,

(2) the original defamatory statement must be made

by a responsible and prominent source,

(3) the defamatory

statement must concern a public figure, and (4) the defamatory
statement must be reported neutrally and accurately by the
publisher.

S^, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639
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F.2d 54, 69-70 (2ci Cir. 1988).

Even assuming, arguendo, that

Globe's article related to a public controversy, the defamatory
republication fails to satisfy requirements two, three and four
Of a neutral reportage privilege.
1.

Defamatory Statements Republished by Globe did notOriginate from a Responsible and Prominent Source?

Globe fails to satisfy the neutral reportage requirement
that the original defamatory accusations be made by a
"responsible and prominent source."

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

Courts which relax the responsible and prominent source
requirement still require the original source to be a "named
individual."
Cal. 1984).

Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F.Supp. 1110, 1130 (N.D.
The reasoning behind the responsible and prominent

limitation is that it increases the likelihood that the
accusations are true.

See Wertman, supra, at 789.

Without the

responsible and prominent requirement, the media "would have
absolute immunity to espouse and concur in the most unwarranted
attacks . . • made by persons known to be of scant reliability."
Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69-70.
In the instant case, Globe republished defamatory
accusations that originated from unreliable sources.
2152.)

(R.T. 870,

Globe irresponsibly relied on information from Robert

Morrow, a minor conspiracy theorist, who obtained his
information from an unnamed intelligence operative.

(R.T. 870.)

Unlike Edwards, where a prominent source made the original
defamatory accusations, Morrow is rated as having "zero
credibility" by his peers.

!

(R.T. 2152.)
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Even more disturbing

is the fact that Morrow is an ex-felon who was convicted in a
Federal Court for counterfeiting,

(R.T. 850.)

Morrow's

personal credibility certainly does not satisfy the "respectable
and prominent" requirement as envisioned by a neutral reportage
privilege.

Furthermore, the original accusations against Mr.

Khawar were not made by Morrow, but by an "unnamed" intelligence
operative,

(R.T. 870.)

The Globe made no attempt to interview

or scrutinized Morrow's unnamed source.

(R.T. 1121.)

Because

the original source of the defamatory accusations was not named,
the article fails to satisfy the "responsible and prominent"
requirement of a neutral reportage privilege.
2.

Defamatory Accusations Republished by Globe were
not Directed at a Public Figure.

Globe's article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage
requirement that the defamatory charges be directed at a public
figure.

While a small minority of jurisdictions extend a

neutral reportage privilege to private individuals such an
extension is inconsistent, with binding California authority.
See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 729-56.
a.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege Requires that
the Defamatory Accusations be Directed at a
Public Figure.

A vast majority of courts only apply the neutral reportage
privilege where a public figure is involved.
V.

Newsweek, 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977).

See, e.g., Dixson
In Dixson, the

Tenth Circuit recognized a neutral reportage privilege, but held
it inapplicable against the private figure plaintiff.

30

Id. at

628.

The Dixson court balanced society's interest in free press

against the importance of individual reputation and held: "The
protections afforded the press when it reports on . . . public
figures do not shield it from liability when it publishes
defamatory statements concerning private individuals."
at 631,

562 F,2d

Here, Globe published defamatory statements against Mr.

Khawar, a private figure.

Thus, Globe should not be allowed to

use a neutral reportage privilege as a shield against liability.
b.

A Neutral Reportage Privilege that Extends to
Private Individuals is Inconsistent with
California Defamation Jurisprudence.

A small minority of jurisdictions inappropriately extend a
neutral reportage privilege to private individuals.
April
1988).

V.

See, e.q.,

Reflector Herald Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App,
In April, an Ohio Court of Appeal held the doctrine of

neutral reportage protected a media defendant's defamatory
charges against a part-time cook.

Id. at 471,

The Ohio court

found "no legitimate difference" between private and public
plaintiffs.

Id. at 469.

This outcome is inconsistent with binding California
authority.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 756.

Pursuant to the

Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, California recognizes a
legitimate difference between public and private individuals.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45; Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 756.

In Brown,

this Court rejected an expansion of California Civil Code's
"public interest privilege" from public to private figures.
Cal. 3d at 729-56.
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In Brown, this Court found the importance of

private reputation to outweigh society's interest in a free
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press.

Id. at 742-46.

Accordingly, the Brown Court rejected an

expansion of the public interest privilege because of the
importance of reputation.

Id. at 742-56.

The same rationale is appropriate here.

The public's

interest in the news does not justify an extension of a neutral
reportage privilege to private individuals.

The importance of

individual reputation, as protected under the California
Constitution, must be considered.

See id. at 743.

Article I

section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution,
"reflects a considerable determination that the individual's
interest in reputation is worthy of Constitutional protection."
See id. at 746.

Given the media's "vast resources to inflict

untoward damage upon an individual[,]" Mr. Khawar deserves this
Court's protection.

at 743 (quoting Miami Herald Pub. Co.

V- Ane, 423 So.2d 387, 394 (1982)).

This is especially true

given that defamation actions "represent the individual's sole
remedy against the occasional excess of the print."

See id.

In

light of this Court's reasoning in Brown, this Court should
reject an extension of a neutral reportage privilege to private
individuals such as Mr. Khawar.
3.

Defamatory Statements Republished by the Globe
were not "Accurately and Disinterestedly"
Reported.

Globe's article also fails to satisfy the neutral reportage
requirement that a media defendant present an "accurate and
disinterested" report.

An accurate and disinterested report

presents both sides of a public controversy in a fair and
balanced manner.

See Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.
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In Cianci, the Second Circuit found the defendant's article
defamatory because the defendant did not present both sides of
the issue.

Id. at 69.

The defendant failed to include the

victim's "claim of innocence," "[o]btain [the victim's] version
of the facts," or reveal facts undermining the credibility "of
key sources in the story,"

Id.

The Cianci court reasoned that

a balanced report ensures that a publisher merely reports on a
controversial event.

Id. at 69-70.

Without balance, a reporter

may present a heavily biased article that inappropriately fans
the flames of a public controversy.

See id.

Like the defendant in Cianci, Globe failed to publish a
balanced report and thus failed to satisfy the accurate and
disinterested requirement.
claim of innocence.

Globe did not include Mr. Khawar's

(C.T. 3145.)

Globe made almost no effort

to obtain Mr. Khawar's version of the facts.

(R.T. 1121.)

Globe also irresponsibly refrained from including facts that
could have discredited the defamatory accusations made against
Mr. Khawar.
that:

(C.T. 3145.)

Specifically, Globe failed to mention

(1) Morrow is an ex-felon,

(2) Sirhan Sirhan was convicted

for the death of Robert F. Kennedy,

(3) this Court affirmed

Sirhan Sirhan's conviction, and (4) Sirhan Sirhan admitted to
killing Robert Kennedy and never mentioned receiving help from a
Pakistani journalist.

(C.T. 3145.)

Globe also took several positive acts designed to influence
the defamatory publication.

The trial court found Globe

centered, retouched, lightened and increased the size of the
picture so as to make Mr. Khawar identifiable.
2744.)

(C.T. 3145, R.T.

Globe also added an arrow to the picture pointing
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directly to Mr. Khawar.

(C.T. 3145, R.T, 2744.)

Globe's

interest was not in providing a fair and accurate account of the
facts.

Globe's article was biased and heavily unbalanced.

Therefore, this Court should find the accurate and disinterested
requirement unsatisfied and a neutral reportage privilege
inapplicable.
In sum, a neutral reportage privilege does not protect
Globe's republication of defamatory accusations.

California

courts do not recognize a neutral reportage privilege.

Legal

precedent and public policy militate against recognizing a
neutral reportage privilege, and the facts of this case render
such a doctrine inapplicable.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the Court of Appeal's finding that Globe's defamatory
republication is not shielded by a neutral reportage privilege.
III.

THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT GLOBE'S
ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED WITH ACTUAL MALICE.
To recover damages, a public figure must prove actual

malice.

See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 264-65.

When seeking

punitive damages, private figures must also prove actual malice.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.

Actual malice, or reckless

disregard for the truth, must be determined through case-by-case
analysis.

See Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491

U.S. 657, 686 (1989).

Actual malice exists when the "defendant

in fact entertain[s] serious doubts as to the truth of [the]
publication," but publishes despite these doubts.

St. Amant,

390 U.S. at 731.
Several circumstances may give rise to serious doubts and
may be construed as bad faith establishing actual malice.
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See

Reader's Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257.

Actual malice exists where

a publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only
a reckless man would have put them in circulation.
Ama^, 390 U.S. at 732.

See St.

Similarly, actual malice may be found

"where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports."

Id.

evidence can be used to prove actual malice.

Circumstantial

See Reader^ s

Digest, 37 Cal. 3d at 257.
The evidence here indicates that actual malice exists.
Globe made deliberate decisions not to acquire knowledge of
facts confirming the probable falsity of its article.
1121.)

(R.T.

Globe relied on unreliable sources for its information.

(R.T. 870, 2152.)

Globe also published an article that was

false and highly improbable on its face.

(C.T. 3145.)

Accordingly, Mr. Khawar is entitled to punitive damages.
A.

This Court Should Give Deference to the Jurv^s Factual
Finding that Globe Published its Article with Actual
Malice.

This Court should give deference to the jury's factual
determination that Globe published its article with actual
malice.

Reviewing courts should consider the factual record in

full when determining whether actual malice exists.
Hanks, 491 U.S. at 688.

See Harte-

De novo review only applies to jury

verdicts where there is great danger that the jury will find for
the plaintiff out of sympathy, or find against the defendant out
of hostility to the defendant's speech.
750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

Oilman v. Evans,

(Bork, J., concurring).

Credibility determinations should be viewed under the clearly-
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erroneous standard because the trier of fact has the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses.

See Bose Corp. v.

Consumer's Union^ 466 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1984).
Here, deference should be given to the jury's factual
findings.

The jury had a first-hand opportunity to evaluate

witness credibility.
is no indication that:

De novo review is improper because there
(1) the jury found for Mr, Khawar out of

sympathy, or (2) the jury found against the defendant out of
hostility to Globe's article.

Deference should thus be given to

the finder of fact and the jury's finding should be reversed
only if this Court finds the jury was in clear error.
B.

Globe Acted with Actual Malice Because of its
Deliberate Failure to Confirm the Probable Falsity of
its Article.

Globe acted with reckless disregard for the truth when it
failed to confirm the validity of its article.

A "deliberate

decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm
the probable falsity of charges," supports a finding of actual
malice.

Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692.

Inaction is a product of

reckless disregard for the truth, and thus, actual malice.

See

id.
The failure to interview witnesses and investigate evidence
that may corroborate a story establishes actual malice.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157

See

(1967).

In

Curtis, a newspaper published an unreliable informant's false
description of a university athletic director's purported
agreement to fix a college football game.

Id. at 136.

The

media defendant did not interview witnesses that could have
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corroborated the story.

See Curtis, 388 U.S. at 157,

in

addition, the newspaper never reviewed film of the event that
would have revealed what actually happened at the game.
The Court ultimately found the newspaper liable.

See id.

See id. at

169-70.

Inaction served as evidence of the newspaper's actual

malice.

See id. at 157.

Similarly, Globe's inaction establishes actual malice.

The

article's author, Mr. Blackburn, failed to contact the person
called "Ahmand" in Mr. Morrow's book.

(R.T, 1121.)

While Mr.

Blackburn testified that he believed that he checked with Los
Angeles directory assistance, his notes reflect no such attempt.
(R.T. 1121, 1096-97.)

When weighing Mr. Blackburn's

credibility, the jury found his inaction sufficient to justify
actual malice.

(A.C.T 2782.)

The jury's review of witness

credibility should not be overturned here.
Even assuming, arguendo. Globe made an unsuccessful attempt
to find Mr. Khawar, its inquiry should not have stopped there.
Globe did not review the Los Angeles Police Department archives,
nor the FBI archives.

(R.T. 1121.)

anyone present at the event.

Globe did not interview

(R.T. 1121.)

Finally, like the

newspaper in Curtis, Globe did not review film of the
assassination which would have revealed that Mr. Khawar was not
present when Senator Kennedy was shot.

(R.T. 1121.)

Globe's

inaction is clear and convincing evidence that it published its
article with actual malice.
///
///
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C.

Globe Acted with Actual Malice Because its Article was
Glaringly False and Absurd,

Globe's article was absolutely untrue and absurd.

An

article that is false, or that is highly improbable on its face,
is published with actual malice.

See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at

691; Carson v. Allied News, 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1975).
In Carson, the Seventh Circuit held that a tabloid's
fabricated assertions about the move of Johnny Carson's Tonight
Show from New York to Los Angeles evidenced actual malice.
F.2d at 213.

529

The tabloid's article was loosely based on a

Chicago newspaper story.

See id. at 210.

The tabloid's

accusations were held to be "completely fabricated" and highly
improbable on their face.

See id. at 212.

Here, Globe's article is also completely fabricated and
highly improbable on its face.

The Globe article claims Iranian

secret agents killed Senator Kennedy.

(C.T. 3145.)

Globe's

article claims that the Iranian agents were hired by the Mafia.
(C.T. 3145.)

The article claims that the Mafia was responsible

for President Kennedy's death.

(C.T. 3145.)

The article also

claims that Senator Kennedy was, actually, shot by a "camera
that was really a gun."

(C.T. 3145.)

These assertions, are

false and improbable given that Sirhan Sirhan was arrested and
convicted for the murder of Senator Kennedy.

(R.T. 800.)

Based

on these facts, the jury found Globe's article was published
with actual malice.

(A.C.T, 2782.)

Globe's article is the product of a conspiracy theorist's
imagination and has no basis in reality.

The evidence indicates

that Globe published its article with actual malice.
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Globe did

not acquire knowledge of facts confirming the probable fals
of its article.

(R.T. 1121.)

sources for its information.

Globe relied on unreliable
(r.t. 870, 2152.)

Globe also

published an article that was false and highly improbable on its
face.

(C.T. 3145.)

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the

jury’s finding that Globe published its article with actual
malice,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeal's decision
affirming the lower court's rulings, should be affirmed.
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